Encryption algorithms utilized in mobile communication systems have been under attack since their introduction, and many of these attacks have been successful in practical settings. One such example, A5/1 used in GSM, was attacked using "Rainbow Tables", i.e. pre-computed tables that trade long offline computation and large storage for runtime efficiency when cracking the code. Traditionally, Rainbow Tables were used to reverse password hashes. Their application against A5/1 opened up a new domain of exploitation.
INTRODUCTION
Encryption algorithms and security protocols used in mobile communications systems are constantly under attack. One reason is that those systems (e.g., GSM, UMTS, GPRS, etc.) are used by billions of users in almost 200 countries. The ability to intercept user traffic (voice calls, text and multimedia messaging, personalized tokens for authentication, access control, e-payments, e-voting and sensitive data exchanged by other mobile applications) is appealing to a number of entities (e.g. criminals as well as law enforcement agencies for legal interception). By exploiting security weaknesses, attackers have the ability to clone cell phones and consequently, steal phone services or perform illegal activities over cloned phones. Another reason for those systems being targeted is that the algorithms and protocols used are proven to be weak and ill-designed making practical attacks possible [4] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [11] , [14] , [15] .
A basic goal in cryptanalysis is the computation of the inversion of one-way functions without knowing the trapdoor, e.g. a secret key. For instance, an attack on a block cipher analyzes the mapping of the key to the cipher text, which should be a one-way function. If such a cryptographic function leads to an "n-bit" result (the size of the plaintext block and the associated ciphertext block), there are two straightforward methods: a) an exhaustive key search can be performed over an average of 2 k−1 values until the plaintext is recognized (where k is the key size and usually k > n), b) 2 n input and output pairs can be pre-computed and stored in a table. In order to invert a particular value, we just look up the value in the table; in this case inverting the function requires a single lookup.
Neither of these two generic attacks are practical. The brute force approach requires no storage (memory) but very high attack time [25] , while the codebook attack is instantaneous but it requires large storage (the storage is practical when the key size is less than 64 bits). For example, a plain codebook for the A5/1 encryption algorithm utilized in GSM networks requires 128 Petabytes of storage and takes more than 100,000 years to compute on a single threaded CPU [14] . A compromise is to trade time for storage. In fact, both can be traded for a higher possibility for a successful attack. Less available storage makes the program slower, while reduced computation time requires increased memory use. The main idea is to exploit the time-memory trade-off (TMTO) to make a program produce results much faster than the theoretical approach presented in [13] .
The TMTO approach was pioneered by Hellman in 1980 [13] . In 2003 and in 2008 Oechslin further expanded  Hellman's approach and suggested the Rainbow Tables [20] , [5] . Oechslin combined the TMTO approach with the advantage of having distinguished points a way to further reduce the number of memory accesses. Those Rainbow tables have been successfully utilized in cracking A5/1, one of the encryption algorithms used for voice confidentiality in GSM. This algorithm was introduced in the late 80s and it was academically broken (i.e. not practically, but with a complexity better than brute force) in 1997. In the last few years, practical cracking attacks on A5/1 based on Rainbow  Tables have been publicly demonstrated. In general, the  initial cost of computing Rainbow Tables is as high as a  single brute force run but the incremental computational cost  per crack is negligible. In this paper, we present an FPGA-based architecture for the efficient creation of Rainbow Tables for the A5/3 (Katsumi) block cipher that is used in 2 nd and 3 rd generation mobile communication systems. We propose an architecture that exploits the parallelism in the Rainbow Table creation process. We show that using a Virtext5 LX330T FPGA we can achieve speedup of about 9x for a single compute engine, and around 550x for 64 compute engines compared to a single-threaded software implementation executed on a stateof-the-art CPU. We show that due to limitations to available memory for our particular experimental setup our approach achieves high success rates when the key space is only to 2
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. We then demonstrate how our proposed architecture can be seamlessly extended so as to efficiently create significantly larger Rainbow Tables to address the full key-space.
RELATED WORK
In the last few years several practical attacks, based on the concept of Rainbow Tables, on GSM's A5/1 algorithm have been presented.
In 2008, the group The Hackers Choice constructed a large look-up table of approximately 3 Terabytes and then claimed that they were able to intercept and decipher any GSM call or SMS encrypted with A5/1. Their aim was to derive the encryption key, in a very short amount of time, and hence listen to the call and read the SMS in clear [14] .
In August 2009, in a similar effort, the A5/1 Cracking Project, created the look-up tables using Nvidia GPUs via a peer-to-peer distributed computing architecture. According to the authors, the approach can be used on any cipher with key size up to 64-bits [14] .
In December 2009, the A5/1 Cracking Project announced and published over BitTorrent 2 Terabyte attack tables for A5/1. The tables use a combination of compression techniques, including Rainbow Tables and distinguished point chains. These tables had been computed during three months using 40 distributed CUDA nodes [4] . This setting makes it easy to derive the session key of any particular conversation with minimal hardware support.
In 2010, the A5/1 Cracking Project announced a switch to the faster ATI Evergreen (GPU family) code, together with a change in the format of the tables resulting in even faster attacks on even cheaper hardware.
In 2011 a mainstream desktop PC having one high end graphics card and some Terabytes of flash memory was sufficient to break the encryption of A5/1 GSM sessions in a few seconds with a probability above 90%. This is not possible in the case where plaintext randomization is applied, a technique where the input (plaintext) space of the encryption algorithm is expanded.
As shown in the above paragraphs, attacks based on Rainbow Tables have been concentrated on attacking the A5/1 algorithm. In this paper, we demonstrate the first FPGA-based architecture for the efficient creation of Rainbow Tables for the A5/3 block cipher.
The first FPGA system implementing Hellman's method was proposed by Quisquater [22] . This system could attack cryptographic systems that use the 40-bit key DES algorithm. Quisquater also presented cost estimations for the cryptanalysis of a full DES (with 56 bits key). A more generic, full-cost analysis of the time-memory trade-off with and without distinguished points has been provided by Wiener in [26] . In 2005, N. Mentens et al. implemented on an FPGA platform an efficient system for cryptanalysis of the UNIX password hashing, using the Rainbow Table approach [17] , [18] .
COPACOBANA, the "Cost-Optimized Parallel COde Breaker", is a large-scale FPGA-based parallel machine optimized for running cryptanalytical algorithms [27] . It used 120 FPGA chips and was used for cracking DES using an exhaustive key search (i.e. a brute-force approach). COPACOBANA was also used in an attack on A5/1 using Rainbow Tables, but the description in [27] is very short. Due to the limited description and the attack on a different algorithm it is difficult to make a direct comparison with our work. Kalenderi et. al. used a similar approach for cracking the A5/1 cipher using Rainbow Tables [28] . The main difference with that work is that we address the more recent and more relevant A5/3 cipher, we provide an in-depth treatment analysis of coverage, and we show how our system can be used for larger key spaces.
THE KASUMI BLOCK CIPHER
In this section, we briefly describe the A5/3 cryptographic algorithm, and discuss a number of known weaknesses of the algorithm.
Kasumi Block Cipher
The Kasumi cipher is an encryption algorithm used in UMTS, GSM and GPRS. Kasumi is based on an earlier algorithm, MISTY1 developed by Mitsuru Matsui [19] . The algorithm uses a 128-bit key and operates on 64-bit data blocks (more like DES rather than 128 bit blocks as is the case with AES). Kasumi is a block cipher with Feistel structure, comprising of eight rounds. Each round uses a 16-bit sub-key derived from the original 128-bit encryption key. The substitution boxes S7 and S9 provide non-linearity. More information about the Kasumi block cipher can be found at the specification of the 3GPP specifications [1], [2] .
Kasumi Cryptanalysis and Weaknesses
In 2003, successful man-in-the-middle attacks against the GSM protocol completely bypassing the A5/3 algorithm were presented [7] . In 2005, a faster than brute force but impractical related-key attack demonstrated that Kasumi was not as strong as it was believed [8] . In 2010 a practical related-key attack demonstrated that changes made to the MISTY1 algorithm to meet 3G requirements in fact weakened the final design of A5/3 [11] .
A major weakness of the Kasumi algorithm, in some settings (e.g. GSM/GPRS), is its key size [21] . The algorithm originally uses a 128-bit key but the effective key length in those settings is only 64 bits due to the way the key is derived from the original GSM/GPRS 64 bit key. The 64-bit key is duplicated to produce the 128-bit key and thus the effective key length remains 64 bits. However, in 3GPP WCDMA systems Kasumi is used with a 128-bit key. In [29] it is explained in more detail why the effective key length of the A5/3 algorithm is reduced to 64 bits.
In some other settings, for backward compatibility and roaming across legacy networks, both A5/1 and A5/3 algorithms are used and both algorithms use the same (short) keys. In yet some other settings, protocol manipulation (semi-active attacks) forces handsets to switch back to A5/1. The fact that A5/1 is broken means that A5/3 is also vulnerable in that scenario because the attack will be successful on the weakest link, the A5/1.
A Kasumi 64-bit block would be theoretically vulnerable to a 2 64 lookup-table (codebook) attack, whereas AES would require a significantly larger table (2 128 entries), as explained in the introduction.
RAINBOW TABLES
A Rainbow Table is defined as a compact structure used to reverse one-way cryptographic functions. It was originally used to reverse password hashes. In that particular case, a Rainbow Table consists of related plaintext password sequences and associated hashes (password-hash chains).
Each chain starts with an initial password, which is processed by a hash function. A reduction function is then applied to the resulting hash and the outcome is a different plaintext password. The reduction function is not the inverse of a function (which is one-way), but it is a function that returns a value from the plaintext's space (Figure 1) . A different reduction function is used in each step in order to avoid chain collisions, i.e. chains with the same contents. This process is repeated for a fixed number of times (chain length). The initial and final passwords of the chain comprise a Rainbow Table entry and they are called Starting Point (SP) and Ending Point (EP) respectively. Thus, a chain with thousands of hashed passwords is stored as a single pair (SP, EP), and starting with different SPs we come up with a different chains and sequences of password hashes (Figure 1) .
Recovering a password using a Rainbow Table is a two step process. First, the password hash is processed by the reduce-hash sequence. The structure of the table and its reduction function guarantees that the running password will match a final password on one of the chains (not necessarily the correct one). Second, the hash-reduce iteration is repeated, starting with the initial password (SP) of that chain, until the password hash in question is found. The password used at the last iteration (the one that matched the hash in question) is the one being recovered (Figure 1) .
Rainbow Tables are based on the observation that precomputed hash values make password cracking much faster compared to the exponential time required for a brute-force attack. Increasing the Rainbow Table size decreases the time required to reverse a hashed password.
One way to defend against the Rainbow Tables based password cracking is to use one-way hashes that hash the password concatenated with the salt, a large random value. In this case, the attacker needs to pre-compute all tables for all salt values. A large salt value (e.g. 128 bits) makes the Rainbow attack impractical.
FPGA-BASED A5/3 RAINBOW TABLE CREATION
In this section we describe our A5/3 implementation. We first describe the basic encryption engine, and then we show how we can exploit the FPGA size and parallelism to create multiple Rainbow Table entries in parallel.
Encryption Engine
To implement in hardware the A5/3 algorithm we used the 3GPP specifications and to verify correctness we used 3GPP's Implementer's Test Data [3] . The implementation is straightforward and the placed and routed design for a single ciphertext block on a Virtex5 XC5VLX330T needs 3,866 LUTs (and no memory or DSP blocks), and operates at about 110MHz. This design needs eight cycles to produce one new encrypted result, so the effective throughput is one result every 72.8 nsec.
In order to verify the correctness but also to compare the speed and efficiency of our design, we also implemented the algorithm in software, based on [12] . The correctness was verified by comparing our output to that in [3] . We profiled the execution of our s/w implementation on an Intel dualCore i5 processor at 2.26 GHz using the GNU profiler (gprof). The gprof results and the h/w speedup are shown in Tables 1 and 2 . We can see in these two tables that -as expected-the encryption process corresponds to about 93% of the S/W execution time. We can also see that the FPGA implementation, despite its frequency limitation, is about 19 times better in terms of effective throughput. The function names in Table 1 are taken from [2] which also explains their functionality.
Rainbow Chain Creation
In this section we describe the method we used to generate the A5/3 Rainbow tables. In Figure 2 , E is A5/3, R is the reduction function and P a constant plaintext block. We chose m different keys as chain SPs. To start creating the chain E SP (P) is computed, where SP is an encryption key. The result is a ciphertext block that needs to be processed by R function (which maps ciphertexts to keys) to compute a new encryption key. In each step (as many as the chain length, say t), a different R is used. After t steps, the pair (SP, EP) After the Rainbow Table is created, we can use it to derive the encryption key as follows: We take the recorded ciphertext and we compute chains (up to t steps) starting from R(C) and checking every time whether the key that was computed exists as an EP in the (entire) Rainbow Table. If that key is found in the table as an EP, we know that somewhere in the chain there is the key for our particular encryption, but we still do not know which one it is. To find it, we need to start from the starting point of the chain (the corresponding SP), and apply the same encryption process as we did in the chain creation, only this time we compare the results of each encryption to the encrypted text. Since we did find the EP it is guaranteed that we will find the corresponding entry in no more than t steps. This means that the cracking process takes up to t lookups in the Rainbow Table to find if the encoded text exists as an EP in the table, and then up to t encryption and reduction steps to process the particular chain, i.e. the crack time is fixed. This process applies when the chain elements store the entire encrypted entry. When a reduction function is used, the process is used as described above, but the fact that we found the EP in the table lookup does not guarantee that the chain will produce the key. If the chain search process does not produce a match, then that Rainbow Table cannot recover the key.
In our setting the TMTO was limited by the memory available in our experimental platform, which was 256Kbytes, and since our EP and SPs are 128 bits each, the memory was able to store only 2 16 (SP, EP) pairs. Remember that the produced entries (SP, EP) must be stored in the Rainbow table sorted along the EP dimension to simplify the EP lookup. We addressed this requirement by hashing the EP value down to 16 bits. In this case, inserting an entry in its proper spot is easy: the hashed EP is used as an index to the memory.
l tables were produced with m chains of size t in each table, where each (SP, EP) pair was 2 x 128 = 256 bits long. Memory size is given by M = m x l x m 0 where m 0 =256. Time is given by T = m x l x t 0 where t 0 is the time needed to compute one chain. The success rate for one table is given by the following formula, where N is the key space and m i is the number of chains for each table.
With more tables the success rate increases. For a key size k bits a chain length of t = 2 k/3 gives success rate above 50%. In our case we assume that the key is not 128 bits but only 64 bits, so the effective key space is 2 64 (remember that this is a realistic assumption for the GSM use of this algorithm). Constrained by our memory size, we chose a key space in the order of 2 42 (we address lifting or mitigating this restriction later on in this section). Based on the above assumptions the success rate we achieved is depicted in Table 3 130,000,000 0.86
Parallel Chain Creation
The overall system architecture, shown in Figure 3 , was constructed in a very similar manner to [24] and [28] exploits the parallel nature of the creation of Rainbow Table  entries . Each chain starts at a different starting point and is completely independent of all other chains. The only common point is the memory that stores the entire table. We use random starting points, resulting from a 64-bit counter and once we begin the creation of a chain, the random number generator can feed a different chain engine in a round robin fashion. Note that the time required to create a chain is not fixed, but depends on the length of the chain which is an implementor's choice. Also, since the number of elements in each chain is large and computing each element takes multiple cycles, neither the random number generator nor the memory controller is performance bottleneck.
To implement different R functions (as needed for better coverage) for each level of the Rainbow table (chain link) we used a simple XOR function with a counter. Also, we have to note that we noticed less than 5% unused memory due to hash collisions so, we considered it as of minor importance. After implementing the system, we tested its correct operation and compared again its results against those of the software implementation using a number of test benches that confirmed the correctness of our design.
Experimental Results
To achieve a significant success rate, long chains are required. In our design, we assumed that the key space is 2 42 instead of 2 64 due to memory limitations of our implementation. For a key space in the order of 2 50 and the available memory, the success rate is around 1%. So, in our design, memory was the limiting factor.
To compare our results with software-generated tables on an Intel dual-Core i5 processor at 2.26 GHz we used the code provided by the Rainbow crack project [23] after integrating A5/3 into it. Table 4 shows the speedup achieved. The speedup using a single chain creation engine varies slightly with chain length, but the Virtext5 LX330T FPGA is roughly 9x faster compared to the single threaded software when the chains are long enough to achieve good success rates. The results shown here were for a chain length of 100,000, but they hold similarly for longer chain lengths, as required for good success rates (see Table 3 ). To produce the results of Our design was parallelized up to 64 times, so that multiple chains are computed in parallel. Table 5 shows that the impact of the larger design size on the operating frequency was negligible. Figure 4 shows that the table creation time reduction is almost linear with the number of available engines indicating that our approach is scalable.
Finally we address the power consumption of our design: the FPGA board with our design loaded consumed in the order of 4 Watts. This power consumption is minuscule compared to either general-purpose processors (usually in the tens of Watt), or GPUs (usually in the few hundred Watt range). Combined with the computational speed, our architecture proves very power efficient for creating Rainbow Tables. To the best of our knowledge, no results against A5/3 using GPUs have been published. Extrapolating from similar studies on A5/1 [14] [28] we believe that the performance of a full FPGA is comparable to a GPU in terms of processing speed, while the power consumption is almost two orders of magnitude better for the FPGA. The first option, using DDR memory, is the most straightforward: given the low chain creation throughput (in the order of one chain per several seconds) and the small amount of information used to represent each chain, the DRAM bandwidth is not a bottleneck to write the produced entries even for unoptimized, small writes. Recall that the address of the new entry is known in advance, so there is no need for sorting of the results.
Extending to Larger
Using hard disks is more complex, as the granularity of write operations is at the block level, while table entries are produced at arbitrary locations. The solution is to create large, independent sub-tables in memory and then write them to disk in a sequential and hence efficient manner. Then a merge-sort step can re-arrange the table elements to be sorted along the EP values. Fortunately, efficient sorting algorithms for tertiary storage are available [31] , and given the relatively low chain creation throughput there is enough extra time to sort the results without seriously hampering the system throughput.
For larger tables, an obvious extension of this work is to use multiple FPGAs in a globally parallel system. This is easy, as long as (i) the seeding of each FPGA is kept different, and (ii) there is enough throughput in the table storage to accept the results. For large tables this can be easily achieved with multiple hard disks.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented an FPGA-based system for creating Rainbow Tables for the A5/3 (Kasumi) block cipher; those tables can be utilized in order to extract part of the key, provided we have a ciphertext block. Our system can create those tables at speeds up to 550 times higher than that of a state-of-the-art CPU. In our real-world experiments, the available memory on our reference board was the limiting factor, and as a consequence we were able to achieve high success rates only when the key space was reduced to 2 42 and for long chain lengths. However, we also demonstrate how our approach can be seamlessly extended to efficiently create significantly larger Rainbow Tables.
Our work shows that the available parallelism in the table creation process can be efficiently harvested using FPGAs. FPGAs are not the only platform for exploiting parallelism. Among the other competitors are multicores that offer smallscale parallelism at a very high power budget, and GPUs that offer much more parallelism at an even larger power budget. Our approach not only is fast, but is the most power efficient approach compared to these two alternatives.
Finally, to further optimize our platform, we could use more optimized A5/3 engines (our implementation was straightforward) such as the ones in [6] and [16] .
